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Abstract—Global Software Engineering (GSE) research 
contains few examples consciously applying what Glass and 
colleagues have termed an ‘evaluative-critical’ approach.  In 
this study we apply dilemma analysis to conduct a critical 
review of a major (and ongoing) nearshore Business Process 
Outsourcing project in New Zealand.  The project has become 
so troubled that a Government Minister has recently been 
assigned responsibility for troubleshooting it.  The ‘Novopay’ 
project concerns the implementation of a nationwide payroll 
system responsible for the payment of some 110,000 teachers 
and education sector staff.  An Australian company won the 
contract for customizing and implementing the Novopay 
system, taking over from an existing New Zealand service 
provider.  We demonstrate how a modified form of dilemma 
analysis can be a powerful technique for highlighting risks and 
stakeholder impacts from empirical data, and that adopting an 
evaluative-critical approach to such projects can usefully 
highlight tensions and barriers to satisfactory project 
outcomes. 
Keywords-evaluative-critical; global software engineering; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a discussion of the assumed benefits of Global 
Software Development (GSD), such as “reduced 
development costs due to the salary savings possible…access 
to a larger and better-skilled developer pool…closer 
proximity to markets and customers” [1], Conchuir and 
colleagues sound a note of caution that “anyone engaging in 
GSD should be aware of the many risks associated with 
these “benefits” [1].  So what can we learn as researchers 
from a project where those risks have been realized, and their 
subsequent impacts for stakeholders? 
In this paper we conduct a critical review of a troubled 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) project, in which the 
transition from an onshore to a nearshore service provider 
has proven to be disastrous.  The project concerns the 
implementation of a system to service the nationwide payroll 
needs of some 110,000 teachers and associated staff in New 
Zealand schools [2].  At the time of writing this paper, the 
project had just been cited as the ‘Novopay debacle’ by New 
Zealand Computerworld [3], and it had become the subject 
of a full ministerial review by a Cabinet Minister allocated 
specific responsibility for the project, at an estimated cost of 
NZ$500,000 [4].  An estimate of the costs in additional 
overtime worked by the 2242 impacted schools in response 
to the problems occasioned since the system’s 
implementation in August 2012, was in excess of NZ$16 
million [5]. 
Before outlining the history and setting the context for 
this recent project, some background is given on prior 
iterations of nationwide education payroll projects some 
fifteen and twenty years earlier, reviewed by Myers [6] and 
Gill [7], respectively.  The parallels are somewhat 
depressing.  Data from one of these prior studies is used to 
highlight the wide range of stakeholders involved and the 
issues they faced.  This leads to a brief discussion on the 
roles of stakeholders and risk assessment in project success 
and failure [6, 8].  We then discuss how one ‘evaluative-
critical’ [9] research approach, namely a modified form of 
dilemma analysis [10, 11], may be applied to tease out 
salient issues and enable significant insight into the inherent 
tensions that generate risks for such projects. 
We subsequently proceed to conduct an exploratory 
dilemma analysis upon publicly available secondary data 
taking into account the perspectives of selected key 
stakeholders in the ongoing Novopay project, which profiles 
three major dilemma clusters.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion on the merits of this technique within an 
evaluative-critical research approach [9] and the value of the 
insights that have been gained.    
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PARALLELS 
Major transitions in payroll processing are not new to 
many large organizations, and are often seen as rather routine 
projects.  Yet in the particular case of the New Zealand 
Education Department the history of such transitions has 
been rather chequered.  Setting the broader historical context 
to the project reviewed here may serve to explain a degree of 
risk aversion on the part of the (now) Ministry of Education, 
who had experienced a major and embarrassing payroll 
project failure some twenty years earlier.  The project was 
referred to as “the failed implementation of a centralised 
payroll system for the New Zealand Education Department” 
[6].  Symptoms included thousands of teachers who found 
they had not been paid correctly, and hundreds who did not 
get paid at all on 8 February (the first pay day of 1989); 
“relief teachers and some part-time teachers had not been 
paid by mid-April” [6].  Yet by June 1989 the Education 
Department’s Director of Management Services “was able to 
announce publicly that the…computerized payroll system 
was on target to meet its objective of saving the Government 
millions of dollars” (through reduced interest costs by 
avoiding the need to pay lump sum holiday payments in 
advance).  Despite this positive perspective, “less than six 
months later the centralised payroll processing was scrapped 
by the government” [6].  
Such pronouncements as that made by the Director call 
into question the definition of project success.  Myers, for 
instance, applying a definition drawing upon “dialectical 
hermeneutics” (an evaluative-critical research approach), 
notes: “Information systems success is achieved when an 
information system is perceived to be successful by the 
stakeholders and other observers” [6].  Yet given the mixed 
views of the parties to this historical project, questions arise 
of: who is a stakeholder, and what influence does each have 
on the outcome?  Whose concerns are most likely to be taken 
into account in the implementation of a new system, and at 
what stage do they become salient? [12] Stakeholders of a 
computer system have been defined as: “People who will be 
affected in a significant way by or have material interests in 
the nature and running of the new computerised system” 
[Willcocks and Mason (1987), cited in [8]]. 
Such a broad view of stakeholders is important.  For 
instance, Gotterbarn and Rogerson [8] note the significance 
of stakeholders beyond the narrow view of the project team 
and the (ubiquitous) customer as the key stakeholders.  They 
observe in relation to their own case study: “It is the failure 
to consider these ‘extra-project’ risks and ‘extra-project 
stakeholders’ which make this project a failed one” [8], and 
argue that inattention to these risks and stakeholders 
contributes to a high failure rate of newly launched products.   
Perhaps an explanation of this all too common 
phenomenon can be found in the model propounded by 
Mitchell et al. [13], depicted in Figure 1.  Positioning 
stakeholders in a framework encompassing relative power, 
legitimacy and urgency of stakeholder concerns enables a 
mapping of stakeholder types to the case above.  For instance 
the Director of Management Services can be viewed as the 
“dominant stakeholder” pushing his business case for 
financial savings; the teachers as the “dependent 
stakeholders” hoping to be paid correctly (with the relief and 
part-time teachers simply waiting to be paid) by the system; 
and the government (who eventually acted) can be viewed as 
the “dormant stakeholder”, responding to the building 
pressures imposed by the unsatisfactory operation of the 
centralized system, and then moving to the position of 
“definitive stakeholder” to effect change.  
Nonetheless it must be acknowledged that the system had 
a highly complex range of stakeholder needs to satisfy, 
which in itself necessarily raised the risk to the project.  
From a textual analysis alone of the brief case study 
description in [6], some twenty-six distinct stakeholders or 
stakeholder groups were identified.  These groups 
comprised: Educators, Financial Organizations, 
Government Departments – National and Regional, non 
salaried educators, Payroll operational staff, Payroll units, 
Political, The Press, School Principals and Regional 
Representatives, Senior Management at National and 
Regional levels, Teachers’ Unions, and the Vendor. 
Yet in 1996 history seemingly repeated itself for the 
Ministry. It outsourced the operation of its central payroll to 
Datacom “the largest New Zealand owned IT company” [7].  
So this was an onshore outsourcing project, occurring within 
the volatile context of a large scale government imposed 
change agenda of radical decentralisation. John Gill 
(Chairman of Datacom) records the events, “The old system 
was disintegrating by the day, however, and although the 
new system was still unsteady, it had to be let run.  The new 
payroll blew apart in a humbling night with teachers not 
being paid at all.  Then over a period of three months, many 
teachers were overpaid and underpaid, some several times” 
[7].  After considerable effort and cost, things stabilised after 
six months of disruption.  Gill observed “Lessons learned 
about the rate of change possible in large systems will never 
be forgotten by those involved”, and “This big bang 
approach is a recipe for failure” [7].  
 
 
Figure 1.  Stakeholder typology (ex. Mitchell et al., 1997 [13]). 
III. CURRENT PROJECT CONTEXT 
The project reviewed in this study demonstrates some 
surprising similarities with the earlier projects respectively of 
twenty-four and sixteen years ago, perhaps sadly illustrating 
that (contrary to Gill’s prior assertion) we do not learn from 
our mistakes, or that generational knowledge in 
implementing software systems does not exceed a ten year 
timespan? 
A chart of the project history by New Zealand 
Computerworld [3] notes the trajectory of what they term the 
“Novopay saga” from its initiation in 2005 to its state as at 
12 February 2013, wherein “Economic Development 
Minister Stephen Joyce has now been appointed as Minister 
responsible for Novopay and has ordered a technical review 
and a Ministerial inquiry into the troubled payroll system” 
[3].  Key milestones in the development of the project as 
outlined by reporter Randall Jackson [3] are highlighted as 
follows: 
• “The Novopay saga began in 2005 when Australian 
human resources and outsourcing provider Talent2 
outbid 10 other potential providers to win a deal to 
replace the Ministry of Education’s payroll system. 
• [The New Zealand Company] Datacom, which was 
among the unsuccessful tenderers, had provided the 
service since 1996.  It had developed a bespoke 
system when it took over the ministry’s in-house 
service”. 
• “Talent2 was to provide the payroll service from 
2010 with a new service desk, pay clerking service, 
technology systems and management processes.  It 
would train school staff in the new system and 
provide on-going support”. 
• “Computerworld reported in April 2010 that the 
transition to the new payroll system had been 
delayed.  The new system was due to be operational 
in the South Island by the middle of the year, and in 
the North Island toward the end of the year”.  
• “[Ministry group manager for the payroll system at 
the time, Kevin] Wilson said the delays meant that 
implementation rates were being reviewed… to 
allow sufficient time for testing to take place”. 
• “The original contract, negotiated under the Labour 
government…, was subsequently renegotiated twice 
by the National government. 
• In 2011 the ministry advertised for a programme 
director and the go-live date was revised...” 
• “Early in 2011 the go-live date was revised to July 
2012 to provide more time to complete customising 
the payroll system”, said Fiona McTavish, group 
manager Education Workforce”.  
• “Computerworld noted that the project was on the 
government’s list of high-risk projects”. 
• (The project eventually went live in a full nationwide 
‘big bang’ implementation on 20 August 2012 [14, 
p. 16]). 
• “Computerworld spoke to the Post Primary Teachers 
Association and the New Secondary Principals’ 
Council after the first, flawed pay run of Novopay.  
• “We are concerned that the Novopay system has 
been unable to meet most of its service targets,” said 
PPTA president Robin Duff. 
• Allan Vester, chairman of the NZ Secondary 
Principals’ Council, said the issues tended to be 
around the fringes… ‘situations around leave 
calculation and relief teachers’”. 
• “Computerworld reported on November 15, 2012 
that the ministry would end up spending more than 
[NZ]$100 million on Novopay”. “According to the 
ministry the total Novopay costs were:  
o Development and implementation - $29.4 
million; 
o Long-run cost - $ 12.5 million a year until 
2018; 
o Assurity Consulting was paid $350,000 for an 
initial testing contract. Subsequent contracts 
took the invoiced total to $842, 000.” 
Relevant documents revealed that 147 software defects 
had been identified when ten project workstream leaders [14, 
p. 17] and three cabinet ministers signed off Novopay [14, p. 
2] and authorized the system to go live in August 2012. 
The summary above briefly profiles the history of the 
troubled transition from one onshore software and payroll 
services provider to a nearshore BPO provider.  A fuller 
official chronology was made available on the Ministry’s 
website [15] as part of its response to “Official Information 
Act requests” (“the data dump”) [3], thereby providing “a 
comprehensive set of Novopay related information from 
project inception to current time” [15].   
IV. METHOD 
We now consider the project just described, in order to 
better understand the diversity of stakeholder perspectives 
and to retrospectively identify sources of risk.  In doing so 
we adopt an ‘evaluative-critical’ research stance. As stated in 
the classification of research approaches and epistemological 
positions by Orlikowski & Baroudi [16]: 
“Critical studies aim to critique the status quo, through the 
exposure of what are believed to be deep-seated, structural 
contradictions within social systems…criteria we adopted in 
classifying critical studies were evidence of a critical stance 
towards taken-for-granted assumptions about organizations 
and information systems, and a dialectical analysis which 
attempted to reveal the historical, ideological, and 
contradictory nature of existing social practices”.  
 
In the study of Software Engineering research by Glass 
and colleagues [9], articles which adopted the above 
definition of [16], i.e. applying an evaluative-critical 
research approach, comprised a mere 1.4% of the 369 
research articles analyzed.  A more recent survey of the 2009 
International Conference on Global Software Engineering 
proceedings found no instances of papers adopting this 
approach [17]. Although it is rarely used, we contend that 
such an approach is ideally suited to an analysis of the 
current Novopay project, given its major social, political, 
financial and legal ramifications to what are seen to be 
standard public sector procurement procedures. 
Methodologically we apply an adaptation of dilemma 
analysis applied in action research studies [10,11], as a 
useful technique for dialectical analysis.  McKernan was 
sceptical about any ‘researcher imposed’ interpretation based 
directly on critical social theory.  Therefore he proposed a 
more empirical approach, using the formal theory of 
contradiction to guide dilemma analysis: "i.e. that 
institutions have conflicts of interests, that members are split 
and divided, and all of this is beset by dilemmas" [11]. 
This enables data to be analyzed not in terms of 
particular opinions, but in terms of the issues about which 
opinions were held.  The classic procedures for dilemma 
analysis involve conducting interviews, then analyzing the 
data in terms of a number of dilemmas, tensions or 
contradictions (categorized as ambiguities, judgements and 
problems).  A set of perspective documents is then 
developed, organized by these categories from the 
perspective of each of the actors in the research project.  The 
dilemmas facing each actor are thus used to build a 
perspective profile for each role in the research project.  
These perspective documents are then normally checked 
with the participants in the research project in order to 
formulate an overall perspective which transcends individual 
beliefs.  The analysis is thus said to be “a ‘mapping’ of 
individual perspectives”.  The advantage of this method is 
that it meets one of Melrose’s [18] requirements for rigor in 
action research, namely that interpretations, theories and 
tentative conclusions be checked with others before, during 
and after the research process.    
However as McKernan [11] observes, developing and 
cross checking perspective documents is a very time-
consuming data analysis method.  In this study we use not 
interviews, but publicly available data, on a high profile and 
troubled public sector project, as textual sources from which 
the dilemmas may be elicited.  The data resulting from this 
project may not consist of lengthy interview transcripts, but 
nonetheless brings forth the concerns of many stakeholders, 
has surprisingly wide coverage and presents a rich and varied 
picture.  In the interests of efficacy we have elected to apply 
an abbreviated version of dilemma analysis as a dialectic 
method to identify the significant tensions that have become 
apparent in the course of the project.  This method may lack 
the confirmatory strength of a full dilemma analysis, but the 
dilemmas are grounded in empirical data and commentary on 
the BPO project, triggered by the insights of the participants 
at multiple levels (from data entry clerks to Ministers of the 
Crown), and encompassing the views of the vendor and 
expert commentators.   
The corpus comprised some 65 data sources, many cited 
here in the references.  They range from briefings to 
ministers; project group meeting records; an official project 
chronology; press commentaries; and included the Official 
Information Act ‘data dump’ response on the Ministry site 
[15].  Our exploratory analysis has proceeded by focused 
reading of a representative proportion of these textual 
sources sentence by sentence, highlighting stakeholders 
involved and identifying within each sentence of the text any 
ambiguity, judgement or problem relevant to that 
stakeholder.  Each of these was then tabulated, resulting in 
279 instances of an issue identified in this way.  The issues 
were then grouped by stakeholder, stakeholder type, or 
stakeholder pair where appropriate (e.g. customer/vendor) 
and refined into issue sets, addressing identified emergent 
themes.  By a process of further abstraction the underlying 
dilemmas relating to each issue cluster were discerned, 
named, and the polar dimensions for each dilemma were 
mapped.  After ensuring that each set of stakeholder issues 
had been mapped to an applicable dilemma cluster, the 
overall dilemma set was reviewed and mapped against the 
other stakeholders to produce a consolidated set of clusters 
and dilemmas which were applicable to more than one 
stakeholder.  This reduced set of dilemmas was then 
analyzed to clarify both the findings from the study and the 
efficacy of this somewhat abbreviated method. The extent to 
which these sources are factual versus mere expressions of 
opinion may be questioned, but the contradictions that arise 
from their very diversity have value in more starkly 
highlighting the embedded dilemmas. 
V. FINDINGS 
A full analysis of the data sources just described would 
result in a larger set of dilemma clusters than can be 
represented here.  In this section then, we present graphically 
two primary dilemma clusters relating to the customer and 
vendor stakeholder pair to illustrate the findings (as these 
were the initial groups of stakeholder perspectives and 
dilemmas supported by the data that emerged as thematic 
clusters from the analysis).  These two dilemma clusters are 
supplemented by a fuller tabulation (adapted from the 
approach of Talanquer et al. [19]) of the issues facing end-
user stakeholders of the system, and the dilemma set relating 
to End-user Satisfaction.   
A. Contract and Service Achievement dilemma cluster 
We first present our Contract and Service Achievement 
dilemma cluster. The stakeholders and issues, identified as 
problems, ambiguities or judgements, from which the cluster 
was derived, are tabulated in Appendix A.  In combination 
with the dilemmas shown in Figure 2, this illustrates the 
approach to dilemma analysis and highlights the data-driven 
nature of the method, despite its critical focus.  It also 
highlights the ability of the method to crystallize higher level 
tensions applicable to other BPO projects from raw 
documentary data and commentary on a specific project. 
 
Left hand pole Dilemma Right hand pole 
Dilemma Cluster – Contract and Service Achievement 
Do your work and tender fairly on an informed 
basis 
Vendor tendering strategies Conduct ‘Back of the envelope calculation’ and 
promise optimistically 
Award contract to lowest bidder Design of tendering process ‘Qualification Based Selection’ 
 
Negotiation, definition and measurement of 
Vendor favorable position 
Definition of service to be provided Negotiation, definition and measurement of 
Customer favorable position 
Agreed measures in place Assessment of service achieved No measure in place (‘KPI holiday’-service 
standards relaxed during transition) 
Targets achieved Contention over service levels achieved Targets not achieved 
 
Planned and agreed remedial action from vendor Negotiation over service levels achieved No vendor action, Vendor excuses 
 
Figure 2.  Contract and Service Achievement dilemma cluster. 
As noted, the dilemmas were developed from the data 
sources and issues extracted in Appendix A, and so are 
empirically grounded in the data.  For instance for the 
Vendor tendering strategies dilemma, Paul Matthews, CEO 
of the New Zealand Institute of IT Professionals (IITP) has 
starkly illustrated the dilemma facing IT vendors [20]:  
“So what do you do if you’re tendering on a hugely complex 
project like this one? Well, you basically have two options. 
You either spend a considerable sum…working through the 
requirements in absolute detail and properly speccing the whole 
project out, all the while knowing that there’s still a very high 
chance you’ll lose the tender… 
Or option 2, you basically “wing it”. You still spend a bunch of 
time, but you only end up with a rough idea of how complex you 
think the project will be, cost that out, build some fat in for 
complexity you missed, put in a bid and cross your fingers.” 
For the Design of tendering process dilemma, IT 
Professional  John Rusk observes in the IITP newsletter [21] 
that sound practices in engineering design projects apply 
“Qualification Based Selection” [22] which separates out 
pricing from capability, in order to support collaboration 
towards safe, well-designed engineering outcomes with fair 
rewards.  He further cautions: “After 15 years as an insider, I 
can say one thing with certainty: awarding contracts to the lowest 
bidder is optimistic at best, and dangerous at worst”. [21] 
In the case of the Definition of service to be provided 
dilemma, there appeared to be several related issues.  The 
Ministry’s stated cost and risk reduction option of 
outsourcing both the system and the business processing 
responsibilities to be managed by contract [23] raised its own 
challenges.  In the Minister’s ‘report back’ to Cabinet on the 
business case for the BPO option, he stated that: “the contract 
has defined the quality of service to be provided through a set of key 
performance indicators” [23]. 
Failure on the part of the vendor to meet critical 
indicators would incur penalties.  Yet in the 2013 briefing to 
the incoming Minister on the, by then, troubled project it was 
reported that “the Ministry has no say in how the service is 
designed – it only specifies the key performance indicators on 
which the service is judged” [24].  
Thus while the BPO option had been selected to reduce 
the Ministry’s operational risk, the loosely defined contract 
for service negotiated actually served to increase the risk 
should the supplier find itself in difficulties.  It also gave 
scope for finger-pointing and argument over the respective 
responsibilities of the parties. 
However there may be times in the life of a project when 
it is considered more beneficial to ongoing progress for the 
parties to co-operate.  In the case of the Assessment of 
service achieved dilemma the Ministry opted to relax its 
contractual requirements and grant a “KPI holiday” to the 
vendor during the messy transition period to avoid a 
compounding of backlog related issues [25].   This was noted 
as “very generous given the stress the sector is under because 
of low service levels” [25]. Yet in respect of the Contention 
over service levels achieved dilemma, the same briefing 
noted that Talent2 inexplicably did not wish to “agree to the 
variation” [25].  Coinciding with this offer the ministry 
proposed “withholding payments to Talent2 because of 
outstanding software defects” [25].  Two months later the 
Ministry wrote to Talent2, notifying it that reduced payment 
penalties would be applied due to failure to meet the 
contracted critical KPI’s for two pay cycles in the previous 
month [26].  The letter further noted that “Talent2 has 
provided to the Ministry a draft ‘KPI dashboard’ on 8 
October 2012 but has not otherwise reported against 
KPI’s…the Ministry does not consider that the ‘KPI 
dashboard’ meets Talent2’s reporting obligations” [26].  
In related email correspondence between the Chairman of 
Talent2 and the Associate Minister for Education, Talent2 
replied that:“…this entire project was a collaborative effort 
between us and the Ministry and the service and system we have 
built reflect a specification and model that the Ministry participated 
in and approved. Some of the design assumptions are clearly being 
challenged and we are working with the Ministry to readjust. A 
good example of this would be the many thousands of relievers and 
the introduction of a new payslip” [27].   
More positively Talent2 noted in the same email the extra 
resourcing it was dedicating to the project: “over 30 
additional FTE have been already added since go-live” [27]; 
service desk loadings were 20% higher than any day since 
go-live and call levels would be monitored for trends, with 
further staff to be added if required; a business analyst who 
had resigned had been replaced; a plan was in place with the 
Ministry to begin outbound calling relating to end-of-year 
processing problems; and senior management planned to 
visit the following week and then the following month to 
review the project status.  The gist of this communication 
then, was a mix of constructive responses, and some blame 
sharing/shifting and excuses.  
B. Global Software Development dilemma cluster 
The next customer-vendor dilemma cluster that emerged 
and is directly relevant to the focus of this paper is the 
Global Software Development cluster, portrayed in Figure 3. 
Although GSD was a natural thematic cluster given the 
focus of the research, these dilemmas are also well-grounded 
in the data sources, for instance for the How to better 
understand customer context dilemma [28] in which the 
Talent2 CEO John Rawlinson cries foul about press reports 
of the $30 million paid to the company, by noting the role of 
New Zealand partners Fronde and Asparona in the 
infrastructure provision and software customizations.  
Contrasting this view is an anonymous blog entry, 
highlighting the cultural sensitivities between a large 
neighbour and a small country, in response to Keall’s article 
[28]: 
“NZ is littered with examples of an Aussie centric 
organisation of blow hards who relocate / centralise support 
services across the ditch and find that having to then contract 
local expertise is far more costly than the local staff they had 
laid off or other such shining examples of management talent”. 
 
Paul Matthews (IITP CEO) notes how the Government’s 
open tendering procurement strategy can disadvantage local 
firms and hamper development of a local IT industry [20].  
The Education Ministry’s briefing to the Minister noted that 
Talent2 “had no senior management bandwidth in New 
Zealand…impeding their ability to make decisions about 
resourcing, priorities and future improvements to the 
service” [24].  The business case for the BPO project noted 
that the Ministry would work closely with the existing 
service provider to support them in achieving “a profitable 
end of contract” [23].  But when the Ministry was evaluating 
contingency options, Leanne Gibson, Chair of the Payroll 
Reference Group, noted that both the incumbent New 
Zealand provider and the Australian firm had independently 
stated “that they would not work with each other as business 
partners” to provide a shared service [29].  Here we see, even 
in a nearshore setting, the classic GSD challenges arising 
from a combination of cultural and geographic distance. 
.
 
Left hand pole Dilemma Right hand pole 
Dilemma Cluster-GSD 
Hire/sub-contract nearshore or offshore How to better understand customer context Hire/sub-contract ‘in-country’ 
Enable onshore vendors (parceling work into 
manageable projects) 
Small country procurement strategy Advantage large offshore vendors (by 
specifying prime contractor role in v large 
scale projects) 
Onshore site Location of senior vendor management Offshore/nearshore site 
Period of ‘bigamy’ (dual vendor with progressive 
phase-out of incumbent) 
Vendor relationship transition ‘Serial monogamy’ (clean break with 
incumbent) 
Service purchaser (lack of control and visibility, 
technical and contestability risks) 
 
Service provider(license payroll software, purchase 
hardware and host at 3rd parties, more expertise and 
responsibilities 
Rationale for new payroll project 
Stage 1 
 
Stage2 
 
Service provider 
 
Service purchaser (delegating risk, completely 
outsourced services, lower cost, higher quality) 
Figure 3.  GSD dilemma cluster. 
Challenges with the Vendor relationship transition 
dilemma, among other factors, resulted in the clean break 
option (or ‘big-bang’ cutover in this project, slated by IITP 
CEO Paul Matthews [20]).  Yet, in the original Cabinet 
decision to implement Novopay [30] the then Minister of 
Education Trevor Mallard had outlined the careful attention 
that had been given to risk mitigation during transition, with 
strategies such as: “an eight month staggered implementation 
that implements the payroll in five distinct areas avoiding a 
high risk big bang implementation” [30].  Somehow over the 
duration of the project this strategy was abandoned.  The 
BPO contract with Talent2 initially envisaged a two stage 
cutover “Novopay was to go live in 2010, South Island first, 
then North Island” [14, p. 9], but eventually the system went 
live across the whole country at once.  The rationale given 
[14, p. 9] was that “Staggered implementations would add 
great complexity to the implementation without necessarily 
significantly mitigating the risks”.  This argument revolved 
around the perceived risks associated with continuing with 
the existing service provider and the fact that many staff 
worked across schools yet needed to receive a single payslip.  
In addition, the contingency option negotiated with Datacom, 
the existing service provider, was due to expire and there 
was a desire to avoid “the end of year/ start of year window” 
[14, p.16].  
A major dilemma that also emerged in our analysis 
revolves around the Rationale for new payroll project. The 
legacy system in 2005 was considered high risk, functionally 
obsolete, was not meeting the new demands of reporting and 
decision making, was difficult to support and lacking in 
operational control [14, p. 3, 29], which provided the 
Rationale for new payroll project Stage 1. The New Zealand 
Cabinet decided to replace this system to enhance business 
processing and provide online access to end users. One of the 
stated reasons was to ‘regain control’ from the external 
vendor and carry out implementation internally. Yakhlef and 
Sié [31] describe a common process of organizations moving 
from producer to purchaser of IT services. In contrast, in 
Stage 1 of this project the Ministry was required to transition 
back from purchaser to provider of services. Provision of 
services requires different skills to those needed in 
purchasing [31]. This transition approach also coincides with 
the evolutionary framework provided by Mirani [32] in 
which he demonstrated through a case study that offshore 
applications tend to evolve and become business critical and 
the client may seek to regain control by establishing a 
“command based hierarchy”. Although for the project under 
consideration the service was not to be offshored – rather, 
the legacy system was initially to be outsourced onshore – 
the situation carries the similar implication of having an 
external provider and the notion of ‘losing control’. To 
regain control and visibility, it was decided that the legacy 
system should be replaced by a commercially available 
payroll package and the Ministry would customize it by 
enhancing the business processing and providing online 
access to principals and administrators at schools [30].  It 
was soon realized (in 2007) that this approach might not be 
optimal or feasible after all [33,34]. After a reassessment, the 
project’s Steering Committee recommended a Business 
Process Outsourcing (BPO) approach.  This approach was 
considered to be less costly, transferring the risk to an 
external vendor and requiring less expertise and fewer 
resources of the Ministry – and provided the Rationale for 
new payroll project Stage 2. Hence, the project, that was 
originally initiated to regain control, ended up again being 
outsourced to an external vendor.  
Comparing this approach to the earlier mentioned 
evolutionary framework of Mirani [32], the relationship 
between vendor and client often starts with contract-based 
assignments in which elementary level projects are 
outsourced to external vendors. Over a period of time the 
client assigns complex applications to selected vendors 
which cultivates network-based relationships; we argue that 
the relationship between Datacom and the Ministry during 
the course of the legacy system operation was network-based 
due to the complexity and nature of the relationship. When 
applications become business critical, the client typically 
regains control by transitioning from network-based to a 
command-based hierarchy.  In stage 1 of this project that 
transition was reversed.  The Ministry would regain control 
as a provider by replacing the legacy system with an 
internally customized commercially available system. Only 
the readily defined payroll processing services would be 
contracted. Figure 4 further elaborates this process: in Stage 
1, we see this reverse approach to the model of Mirani [32] 
being followed by the Ministry; however, in Stage 2, in a 
plan to reduce cost and transfer risk, the project reverts to the 
Mirani model through outsourcing to a new external vendor.   
It could be a characteristic of outsourced Government 
projects that contract and network models (perhaps “in 
conjunction with long-term contracts” [32]) will necessarily 
predominate.  The forms of control through a “command and 
control hierarchy” open to a firm [32], such as “acquiring a 
formal stake in a vendor organization through part or full 
ownership” or setting up “a captive offshore subsidiary” are 
usually less palatable for Government organizations.  If 
ideological reasons do not mitigate against such 
arrangements, natural risk aversion or shortage of capital are 
often barriers. 
C. End-User Satisfaction dilemma cluster 
A summary of issues and dilemmas for a third cluster 
addressing End-User Satisfaction has been included to 
indicate the scope for further analysis (cf. Appendices B & 
C).  One echo of the prior project [6] can be seen in the fate 
of those stakeholders “not paid” by the system, the non 
salaried staff (Appendix B).  As earlier noted in relation to 
Figure 1 above, this group was again relegated to the 
“dependent” stakeholder category.  Their lack of significance 
can be seen in the comments made by the Talent2 Chairman 
when he opined that “the many thousands of relievers” [27] 
presented a surprise, although they were clearly part of the 
reality and always required to be handled by the payroll 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Novopay Payroll Transition process. 
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. Limitations of Study 
The adapted form of dilemma analysis utilized here could 
be criticized for a lack of focus that might otherwise result 
from tighter interview based protocols.  However, the 
process has taken a somewhat opportunistic advantage of the 
plethora of data relating to the project now in the public 
domain [15].  A future study could adopt a more structured 
and systematic sampling strategy.  Yet the steps of analysis 
are relatively consistent in progressively highlighting issues 
relevant to identified stakeholders, framing them as 
dilemmas and consolidating them with explanatory 
narratives.  The closeness to the situation inherent in an 
action research project has not been possible in this research.  
But perhaps that aids the research by ensuring a degree of 
distance from the context, that a more ‘embedded’ researcher 
would lack? Triangulation of dilemmas across multiple data 
sources has not been possible, in the absence of interview 
data.  The fact that the project is a mess, to some extent 
leaves the data as a mess, but with selective probing it is 
open to useful analysis.  This exploratory study has focused 
on two stakeholder pairs and one stakeholder group in 
relative depth, and a wider set of stakeholders and issues 
have been summarized (in Appendices A & B) to indicate 
the scope for further analysis.  So this study remains in a 
sense a work in progress, both in scope and method.  At this 
stage the method can be described as largely processual, 
summarized in diagrammatic form and elaborated in 
explanatory narratives.  Incorporating more robust 
verification techniques, such as inter-rater reliability 
assessments, could be a useful future check for consistency 
of classifications.  Nonetheless, some concrete findings have 
been reported and project-specific conclusions can be drawn 
which may offer more general insight to others engaged in 
such projects.  
B. Future Work 
As noted above there is scope for a more comprehensive 
follow up study.  A fuller analysis could include an 
additional interview phase with the key stakeholders to 
confirm the consistency of stakeholder views upon the 
dilemma clusters this study had identified.  We believe there 
is also scope for application of the method to a project in 
progress rather than retrospectively when things have gone 
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awry.  Periodic project dilemma audits for instance, could 
enable focused review and critique of current project issue 
and risk registers. Given the ready availability of many 
documentary sources in any software project, there should be 
data readily available for analysis in this way.  Simplifying 
the method for practitioners to apply effectively will require 
some work, perhaps aided by a focusing strategy.  For 
instance further research may reveal a set of common 
dilemmas that may even act as ‘archetypes’ for 
consideration.  
In some respects the process of dilemma analysis 
replicates elements of a Software Development Impact 
Statement or “SoDIS Inspection” [35,36], a qualitative 
software risk assessment process which adopts a multi-
stakeholder perspective.  In a SoDIS inspection stakeholders 
and their concerns are similarly assessed for risks and 
clustered accordingly.  Although not specifically designed 
with a GSD emphasis the process has scope for 
accommodating cross border projects (e.g. the nearshore 
COTS project profiled in [36]). Conducting a SoDIS 
inspection [35, 36] using the data sources available from this 
project would be one method by which a follow-up 
comparison study could be conducted.  That could serve to 
triangulate the findings, and demonstrate greater 
methodological rigor.  In adopting the notion of poles in 
dilemma analysis the prospect of considering the repertory 
grid [37] as another possible data collection/analysis method 
is evident.  While these two approaches might not be 
classified as evaluative-critical in their stance, they could be 
included in a multi-methodological study.  Nonetheless there 
is a wide range of other analysis techniques that could be 
adopted within an evaluative-critical approach (cf. for 
instance [6, 38, 39, and 40]).  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this exploratory analysis we have applied an adapted 
form of dilemma analysis [10] to conduct an ‘evaluative-
critical’ [9] review of a troubled BPO project.  The study has 
focused on selected stakeholders of the project and elicited a 
set of dilemmas they have encountered.  We believe there is 
value in the technique for GSD and BPO practitioners from 
the insights we have been able to gain through its 
application.  We also believe that a fuller study addressing 
all project stakeholders (in excess of the 26 in the earlier 
project) would enable a more comprehensive analysis of the 
project and its issues to be presented.  One key insight from 
the sheer number and diversity of issues and dilemmas 
exposed, is to reinforce the views of Myers that in IS 
implementation “there are contradictory perceptions of 
‘fact’, subjective perceptions, and historical factors that 
shape the context of the implementation effort” [6].  This 
strongly supports the use of evaluative-critical approaches to 
research, as they offer methods able to deal with such 
shifting terrain.  We believe that the analysis extends existing 
GSD research approaches, the findings presented are 
meaningful and offer empirically grounded insights into 
GSD and BPO projects that are novel and timely. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE I.  INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES FOR CONTRACT AND SERVICE ACHIEVEMENT DILEMMA CLUSTER 
List of issues for Contract and Service Achievement Dilemma 
Cluster 
Issue Categories Stakeholder types 
D M A N DC M V 
Ministry had no say about how the services will be designed X   X  X  
Ministry only had to specify the KPI’s against which to judge services X X    X  
Talent2 have inadequate abilities to make management decisions in NZ   X     X 
Ministry has lack of information about the number of errors    X   X  
Talent2 argues that defects were at acceptable level   X   X X 
Talent2 missed two out of four deadlines  X     X 
System had known errors when it was rolled out      X X X 
Service model and specifications were approved by the Ministry    X  X X 
Talent2 raising concerns about not being able to meet KPI’s   X X   X 
Ministry issues a warning that material breach could be issued      X X X 
Talent2 hints at litigation if material breach is issued     X   
Multiple vendors are not willing to work in collaboration     X X X X 
Talent2 only provided draft KPI’s  X X    X X 
Talent2 is losing money on this contract   X   X X 
Project was late by two years due to customization   X X  X X 
Talent2 failed to appreciate the complexity of the project X      X 
NZ Ministry kept on moving the goal posts    X  X X 
Public sector projects are generally awarded to lowest bidders    X X X X 
Issue Categories: Definition=D, Measurement=M, Argumentative=A, Negotiation=N, Decision=DC 
Stakeholders: Ministry=M, Vendor/Talent2=V 
APPENDIX B 
TABLE II.  INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES FOR END USER SATISFACTION DILEMMA CLUSTER 
List of issues for end user stake holders Issue Categories Stakeholder types 
F S T Tch Sv E P S NS 
Under paid, over paid or errors or errors in tax deductions X   X  X    
Not paid X   X     X 
Loss of confidence in the system  X     X X X 
The systems lacks in user interaction   X X   X X  
Not able to perform QA checks, due to issues in consolidated reports X  X     X  
Transition to new system has been difficult, frustrating and stressful  X     X X  
Inadequate online training and lack of motivation  X     X X  
Lack of support from customer services and their lack of technical knowledge     X  X X  
Long awaiting time by CS and call-backs not carried out   X  X  X X  
CS staff unable to resolve issues    X X  X X  
CS staff provide contradictory information     X  X X  
Tax code is randomly updated X   X  X    
Empty transactions reports and/or data duplication X   X    X  
Internal funds are being used to pay their staff X       X  
Over expenditures through extra hours being paid to pay roll admins X  X    X X  
Missing family time and holidays  X     X   
Issues closed without further progress    X X  X X  
Workarounds  placed instead of permanent solutions     X   X X  
Backlog of defects in operation    X  X X X X 
Non delivery of commitments  X   X X X X  
Unmet requirements    X  X X X  
Missing successive pay periods X        X 
High Error rates     X  X X X X 
Issue Categories: Financial=F, Socio-Emotional=S, Time=T, Technical=Tch, Service=Sv 
Stakeholders: Educators=E, Payroll operational staff=P, Principals=S, Non-salaried Staff=NS  
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Left hand pole Dilemma Right hand pole 
Dilemma Cluster-End User Satisfaction 
Rely on personal information (resolve issues 
themselves 
Handling variable service quality Cross checking with technical experts 
(Tech. experts are at the nearshore location) 
Work late (extra hours, miss family time) Handling delay from service centers 
 
Go home on time 
Not satisfactory (time consuming, unable to 
resolve issues, abandoned calls and 
contradictory information) 
Not satisfactory (work around solutions and 
report errors) 
Resolve service errors and complaints 
 
Resolve service system errors 
Satisfactory(Issues resolved) 
 
Satisfactory(Permanent solutions) 
Training completed Motivating sector to compete online training 
 
Partially completed or not completed 
Staying within Budget(waiting for issues to 
be resolved) 
Managing budget to pay staff and keep them 
satisfied 
 
 
Relocate funds or overspending 
 
Figure 5.  End User Satisfaction dilemma cluster. 
 
 
